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Translation of Management Control System in Solid Waste Management Network

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Abstract

Privatisation of solid waste management (SWM) in Malaysia occurred in year 2011. After privatisation, SWM is being managed by multiple agencies, from both the public and private sectors. Due to the involvement of many agencies with diverse interests, the management control system (MCS) is crucial to align these interests. Therefore, this study examines the translation process of MCS in privatization of SWM in Malaysia. In particular, the study is designed to understand how the MCS is translated to create a stable SWM network. Drawing on the Actor Network Theory (ANT), the study discusses how the four moments of translation, which are problematization, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation, construct the stability of the solid waste management network.

Keywords: Management Control System, Privatisation, Public Sector, Solid Waste Management, Actor Network Theory

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the areas that need attention nowadays is solid waste management. Record shows that in Peninsular Malaysia, there are 18,000 tonnes of solid wastes are generated daily. It has been estimated to increase to more than 30,000 tonnes in the year 2020 (Moh and Manaf, 2017). According to the survey done by Ministry of Housing, Urban and Local Government (MUHLG) in 2001, only 6% from 112 landfill facilities in Malaysia are having some form of environmental control measures. This situation has given rise to significant environmental concerns, which need an immediate attention. Although government are actively promoted on recycling waste, but statistics shows that currently the recycling rate is just 3-4%. These are among the factors that urged government of Malaysia to expedite the privatization process of solid waste management. Thus, in 2007, solid waste management is privatized to private concessionary, through the enactment of Act Solid Waste Management and Public Cleansing (Act 672).

After privatization, the new structure has been set up. A new Department and a new Corporation were established. The responsibility of the new Department is to handle the issues related to regulatory and policy while the responsibility of managing solid waste and handle the concessionaries were took over by the Corporation. There is also involvement from the private sector, which are the concessionaries, who responsible to provide the solid waste management services.

With the involvement of many parties in managing the solid waste, the implementation become more complex. It involved different tiers of government and the responsibility for management, operational and planning function of waste management were divided into different sections. The different objectives exist among the parties involved somehow will create a cooperation problems (Das and Teng, 2001; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000). Research done by Abas in 2014 clearly shows the different between waste management planning and implementing bodies would create a conflict. To reduce the problems and risk exist, appropriate governance

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structures and good management control system (MCS) are suggested by Das and Teng, 2001 & Spekle, 2001. It is because MCS is an instrument that can influence the other parties' behaviour to ensure that the desirable objectives are achieved (Marques, Ribeiro, and Scapens, 2011).

Hopwood (1996); and Otley (1994) were the first two studies that create attention for the accounting researcher to study the relationship between MCS and inter-firm relationship. Following it, there are many research on the relationship between MCS in inter-firm relationship (K Langfield-smith, 1997; Kim Langfield-smith and Smith, 2003; Mouritsen, Hansen, and Hansen, 2001; van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2006).

However, most of the research are conducted in dyadic relationship especially on the relationship between buyer and supplier in supply chain management. There is not much research done on the network relationship which involved many parties (Mauritsen, Mahama, and Chua, 2010). Furthermore, in public organizations, as Barretta and Busco, (2011) concluded, not much attention were given to study the role of MCS in inter organizational relationship eventhough the privatization process at public organizations shows an increasing after the introduction of NPM.

Therefore, this study is carried out with the objective to understand the role of management control system in creating a stable solid waste management network. The study investigates the influence and coordination of actors involved via the translation process. This study used actor network theory as a theory that underpinned the study. Actor network theory are chosen because it explores the interaction between human and non-human actors.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

New public management (NPM) is a new reform in public sector since 1980s in both developed and developing countries. Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) mentioned that the factors that influence the changes during NPM is cost, efficiency, outputs and performance accountability. NPM shows the importance to re-establish the importance of representative government and managerial principles over bureaucracy (Aucoin, 1990). Bureaucracy has created inferior to the management of public sector who manage the organization. That is why, the primary focus of NPM as mentioned by Hood, (1995) is to decrease the differences between public and private sector.

Malaysian public sector also introduces the public sector reforms over the past decades (Siddiquee, 2006). The privatization of solid waste, which is the context of this study, is one of the practices under NPM (Abdullah and Kaliannan, 2008). However, the actual practices of privatization of solid waste in Malaysia is not match to the definition of privatization itself. The actual practice is actually an outsourcing process. It is because, in privatization of solid waste management in Malaysia, private concessionaries appointed just to implement the work which is monitored and control by the federal government. The practice is similar to the definition of outsourcing, which is, a process where private sectors performing an activity with full responsibility and accountability previously undertaken by a government agency.

Outsourcing, as mention by Idowu, Omirin and Osagie (2011), is a strategy used by local governments as an effort to provide high quality public services at low cost. The advantages of outsourcing especially in public sector include improved in client responsiveness, improved in government decision making, cost saving for the government and also the outside vendors, and assist the local government to utilise the private sector's learning experience and economies of scale (Barretta and Busco, 2011; Johansson and Siverbo, 2011; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000; Marques et al., 2011). On the other hand, there are researchers such as Das and Teng, (2001); Langfield-Smith and Smith, (2003) who have discovered failure in outsourcing process. Among the main reasons for the failure is the different objectives exist among the parties involved in outsourcing which has created the cooperation problems (Das and Teng, 2001; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000).

To reduce the problems and risk in outsourcing, a good MCS is needed (Das and Teng, 2001; Spekle, 2001; Marques et al., 2011). MCS is a process by the managers implementing organization's strategies by influencing other members of the organization (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2001). Historically, MCS is used in vertical relationships within firms. The main focus during that time is to constitute the boundary of the firm and reinforce organizational hierarchy (Hakansson, Kraus, and Lind, 2010). However, today business environment is more relatively decline (Otley, 1994). These changes have transformed the role of management control where the scope is enlarged and no longer confine within the boundaries of organization. It is said that the control systems are growing and self-organized outcome of the interactions in the network. (Caglio and Ditillo, 2008).

In inter-firm relationship, the model developed by Van der meer-Kooistra, and Vosselman (2000) dominate. The outcome from their research shows the importance to draw up a contract based on rules and control mechanisms

that further will create trustworthy behaviour and an open commitment. Following it is a study by Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003). They developed the comprehensive model of management control, where they add trust as one of the variables. However, this study exclude risk in their study although risk is claimed to be affected in the combination of control and trust (Das and Teng, 2001). In 2009, Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra again come out with another study on control for inter firm relationship. They conclude that formal control device or formal incentive scheme is important in accounting for control in inter firm relationship. However, Windolph and Moeller (2012), who focus their study on open book accounting (OBA) to see the influences towards supplier relationship indicate negative findings towards control system. Marques et al. (2011) and Langfield-Smith and Smith, (2003) stress out that MCS is proven as a good tools to reduce the risk in an outsourcing relationship. However, van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2006), mentioned that little attention is given to management control issues with regard to cooperation between inter-firm relationship.

However, all the study mentioned above are the study that focused on various industries using case study on single dyadic relationship. They only have two parties in the relationship, the buyer and seller. Most of the authors have theorised their findings through transaction cost economics (TCE) (Langfield-smith, 1997; Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009; Velez et al., 2008; Mouritsen et al., 2001; Spekle, 2001; Van der meer-Kooistra,; Vosselman, 2000; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2006; Kulmala et al., 2006; Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003). TCE is a neo classical economics theory and the focus is to design the control system with the aim to minimize the transaction costs associated with the alliances. There has been little discussion on the role of accounting in a more complex situation (Lind and Thrane, 2010).

In a complex situation, the relationship is known as network. This kind of relationship is inspired by various theory including institutional theory, actor network theory (ANT), the industrial network approach, and complexity theory. Using ANT approach, the researcher may have the answer on how such pattern of control system come into life, how the control system are maintained, modified or destroyed or how the control system are enacted (Vosselman, 2012).

ANT become the interest of accounting researchers since early 1980s. ANT is different from other theories because it provides a performative lens for the study of social relations including relations between accounting and inter organizational relationship (Mauritsen et al., 2010). From a performative ANT perspective, the focal area is translation. In ANT, actors become attached via the process of translation. Through the process of translation, the identity of the actors and the possibility of interaction are discovered (Callon, 1986). The specific definition of translation is given in work by Latour, (1999) as displacement, drift, invention, mediation and the creation of a link that did not exist before. In ANT, the role of inscriptions and calculations has been brought back as central object in explaining the activities in an accounting study (Justesen and Mouritsen, 2011). Thus, it can be claimed that ANT brings new setting to accounting studies. Rather than simply describing the accounting numbers, ANT focus on the contribution by each actor in the network.

Study by Chua and Mahama, (2007) used ANT to study the accounting in inter-organizational networks. Their finding shows that the strength of the accounting in network setting rely on how it is involved in defining the boundaries, power, and identity of other actors in the network and how other actors in turn define accounting. Mouritsen and Thrane, (2006) concern on the role of accounting as a force in establishing and developing inter-firm relationship. They analysed the roles of management technology act as actors that mediate, shape and construct interfirm relationship using self-regulating and orchestration mechanisms. Based on the case study, they develop a network enterprise.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In term of data collection method, there are two periods of visit. The first visit was on November until December 2015. This is the period of pre-visit. Next, the second period started at February 2016 until February 2017. This study uses multiple data collection method. The use of multiple data sources allowed the study to perform data triangulation and method triangulation.

Data collection process started with document review process. The researcher was allowed to review the following documents, (1) operation manual 2014; (2) concession agreement, (3) appendix of concession agreement, (4) guidelines in monitoring concession companies by PPSPA, and (5) a few minutes of meeting. The duration taken to complete the document review process was three weeks. The researcher had no permission to photocopy the documents, hence all outputs from this process were written in the diary.

Based on the data gathered during document review, the second technique, in-depth interview follows. The study used semi structured interview to provide participants with flexibility to describe their relationship with the process, how the relationship evolves and the reason why such relationships exist. The interview participants were selected based on their involvement in the management function of solid waste management. This study used the concept of follow the actor by asking the key personnel to name other important actors who need to be interviewed. All interviews are recorded. There are twenty interview sessions were conducted at different management level.

In order to strengthen the data gathered, the third data collection method involved is observation method. There are three series of observation were done. The first observation done on the work done by the assistant enforcement officer in two areas. The second observation done on the work done by the concessionary on their daily task inclusive of collection and public cleansing. The third observation done on the process at landfill.

The data gathered during the document review and observation process are recorded in diary. Whereas, the data gathered from interview process are transcribed. All data are then analysed using thematic analysis.

4. FINDING AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Key Performance Indicator as control system in solid waste management network.

After privatization, there is a separation of task among agency involved. Thus, information regarding the performance is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of the network. The Department and the Corporation need to know how well the concessionary is delivering solid waste services to the public. They also need to ensure that the payment made to the concessionary is eligible and accurate. On the other hand, the concessionary need to know the expectation and the policy associated with the solid waste service delivery. To meet these purposes, Key Performance Indicator (KPI) served as the only formal medium of governing the relationship in the network. The concession agreement has granted the concessionary the right to provide the collection services and public cleansing management services in the state of Perlis and Kedah. The services delivered to the public must accordance with the standards specified in the concession agreement and must comply with the KPI mentioned in the appendix of concession agreement. Thus, KPI must be understand by all parties involved in the network of solid waste management in order to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of services delivered.

The initial discussion on KPI development is done by the Department before the privatization of solid waste management was in action. During that time, the Department is seeking help form one international company, to assist them on consultation purposes regarding the development stage. After privatization are enacted, KPI is done on several stages. In three years, only several KPI were enforced, and after that, full implementation of KPI were done. The purpose of implemented stages is to make sure that concession company is ready to provide services according to the requirement expected by the government. The readiness of concession company not only on the mandatory requirement stated in act and agreement, but also on financial ability.

There are 75 KPI being enforced, which is 51 KPI for public cleansing and 24 KPI for collection. KPI has two classifications, which are primary and secondary. Primary KPI is more impactful compared to secondary KPI. The penalty charged for primary KPI also huge compared to secondary. The example of primary KPI is non-compliance of work schedule. This is because, work schedule is prepared by the concessionary, so the enforcement from the Corporation is done based on the work schedule sent by concession company. If on the specified date, for instance, there is no waste collection although stated in the work schedule that waste will be collected on that day. So, the impact of non-compliance of work schedule will give impact on the whole system. Different from secondary KPI. Example of secondary KPI is missed collection. For instance, there are ten bins should be collected at that area, but the operation staffs collect on eight bins. The impact on secondary KPI is not as much as primary KPI.

The purpose of using KPI is for uniformity purposes. Before privatization, each local government has their own authority in handling solid waste. This situation creates no uniformity in the services provided by the local government. The service recipient, which is the public, pay the same assessment taxes to their respective local government, but then services provided are vary between local government in Malaysia. Thus, the intention of government to provide an equal solid waste management services to all state in Malaysia. So, they achieved it through KPI.

There are two implications of KPI. If concession company been given KPI, the implications are, (1) their KPI will be deducted, and (2) the payment for the KPI given will not been paid. So, KPI has two implications, first is the penalty and the other one is the deduction of payment. That is why it is important to ensure that all actors involved

in solid waste management are clear and understand each and every KPI used in the network, because double penalty will be given if there is non-compliance of KPI.

KPI play the role as network control based on monetary basis performance indicator. The KPI were linked to the performance of the concessionary. Every month, there is meeting known as concession meeting between the concessionary and the Corporation. In the meeting, the total KPI charged to the concession company will be presented by the Corporation. If the number of KPI reduced, then they are considered good. Each KPI charged to the concession company can be argued, but only State Director of the Corporation has the authority to accept or reject the final decision. All KPIs charged on concession company will be accumulated and at the end of the month, the Corporation as the pay master will deduct it from the total payment claim by concession company. When the total KPI reached certain limit, the Corporation will issue reminder letter and suggestion for termination will be sent to the Department. The authority to terminate any contract on concession company is on the Department. That is how KPI play the role as network controls.

4.2 The translation of management control in privatization of solid waste management process.

ANT is a theory that look at the interactions between science and society as a network. To see how the network is created, the use of sociology of translation was introduced by Callon, (1986). A translation process is needed to create the actor network and to enrolled all actors into the network (Smith, Rose, and Hamilton, 2010). In translation process, human and non-human actors negotiate to define their interests and actions in the network.

In this sub-topic, the discussion of sociology of translation in privatization of solid waste management was discussed. The discussion is based on Michel Callon's four moments of translation; problematisation, interessment, enrolment, and mobilisation.

4.2.1 Problematisation

This is the first moment in sociology of translation. In this moment, a set of actors were determined and defined their identities to establish themselves as an obligatory passage point in the network (Callon, 1986). The focal actor is responsible to determine other actors and their identity. In this study, there are a number of actors involved in the privatization process.

The privatization of solid waste management can only be implemented after The Solid Waste and Public Cleansing Management Act (Act 672) were gazetted in 2007. After the enacted of Act 672, there must be one agency responsible to handle the privatization process. Thus, Department A was established together with the enforcement of Act 672 in 2007. As mentioned by Head of Department, Department A:

"Department [Department A] drafted Solid Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act. That is the first contribution from Department although there are also members from Corporation X. But, we [Department A] is the organizer. Then, Department also drafted Tripartite Agreement. And the third is, the Department involved in the preparation of concession agreement, then Department also involved in preparation of the rules under Act."

Thus, Department A is the focal actor in this privatization process. The responsibility of Department A is more on policy maker. Thus, another actor exists in the network, which is Corporation X. The responsibility of Corporation X is to do the monitoring and enforcement task. The establishment of Corporation X is under the enactment of the Corporation of Solid Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act 2007 (Act 673). According to the act, the Corporation X did not have power at sole, but the power is delegated by Head of Department of Department A. The purpose of establishment of Corporation X is for implementation, monitoring and management of concession company. As mentioned by the State Director:

"The corporation's state level implements the policy made by headquarters at Kuala Lumpur. Among the policy are monitoring and enforcement towards concession company. How to monitor, how to give penalty, what is the correct KPI to monitor. Secondly, we also have to look on 3R. We have programme with mosque, community, school, kindergarten, university and many more. We do a lot of campaigns on awareness and the programme of Separation at Source which will be enforced on 1 June." The third actors involved in the process is the concession company. For privatization, concession companies appointed are according to zone. There are three zone; northern, southern and central zone. Hence, there are three concession companies involved in the privatization process. However, in this study, only one concession company is selected due to the access given. All the work done by the concession company must according to Concession Agreement. Concession agreement details the responsibility of each party, i.e. the Department A (representing the Government), the Corporation X and the concession company.

Since many actors involved, there is the point of this study which is "how the focal actor controls the whole network on the implementation of privatization of solid waste management". This become the problematization related to this study. Figure 1 below shows the obligatory passage points within the problematization in order to achieve the target of the network.



Fig. 1 : Problematization

4.2.2 Interessement

The second moment is interessement. Interessement is the group of actions by which an entity attempts to impose and stabilize the identity of other actors it defines through its problematization (Callon, 1986 p. 203). This is the moment where the focal actor seek to lock other actors into their identified roles (Smith et al., 2010).

In this study, the focal actor, The Department X, used Key Performance Indicator (KPI) as a main device that is placed between all actors. KPI used is monetary based. According to the Branch Manager of Corporation X:

"When we close the account at month end, all KPIs that has been charged to concession company will be deducted from the full amount they claimed on work done by them [concession company]. Example, if they [concession company] claim RM20,000, they have KPI of RM1,000, so the final payment from us [Corporation X] will be RM19,000 only."

There are 75 KPIs being set for the process. It is divided into 51 KPIs for public cleansing and 24 KPIs for collection of solid waste. There are two types of KPIs, which is primary KPI and secondary KPI. The primary KPI is the main KPI which is compulsory for the concession company to comply. The fine charged for primary KPI is huge compared to secondary KPI. The secondary KPI is the fault done by the concession company which is more related to imperfect work done. The example of primary and secondary KPI mentioned by the Branch Manager of Corporation X as follows:

"Example of primary KPI is schedule. Mentioned in the collection schedule that household waste will be collected on Wednesday, but it did not been done on Wednesday. Either they collect it on other days or did not collect it at all, both are charged under primary KPI denoted as P3: compliance with approved collection schedule and frequency (from document review). The fine for this KPI is high. On the other hand, example for secondary KPI is let say suppose the concession company must collect 10 bins, but they collect only 8 bins, missed 2 bins. This is called missed collection, denoted as S3: All contracted solid waste shall be collected from all collection points, on the collection schedule time and day (from document review)."

In daily operation of solid waste management, KPI being used as main device for The Department A, the Corporation X and the Concession company.

From the eye of each actor involved:

"KPI is part of the agreement, thus it is compulsory for the company [concession company] to comply. We [Department A] do not involved at site. We do not go to check their work at site because we have monitoring agency [Corporation X] to do it. What we did is, we have two committees in concession agreement, where we asked the Corporation to present the list of KPIs being charged to the company [concession company]. The presentation is more on to check their [concession company and Corporation X] performance, for us to monitor. Then, we will discuss with them the problems, if any, like misunderstanding of KPI or argument on KPI."

[Assistant Director, Department A]

"In the schedule submitted to us, they mention already how many houses for waste collection. Let say Taman A has 100 houses, Taman B has 50 houses. So, from that schedule, our enforcement officer will check randomly. Let say from these 100 houses, he [enforcement officer from Corporation X] has check for 3, 4 times and let say half of it still not collected [household waste]. So, it confirmed that the lorry [concession company's lorry] did not come right? So, we monitor their work from the number of houses. Just imagine if they did not collect waste from these 100 houses, how many KPI we will charged them then?"

[The Engineer of Corporation X (previously Deputy Director at Corporation X headquarters]

"In term of implementation, its [KPI] good. Except the enforcement, sometimes got hiccup because its more on human [the enforcement officer]. In term of control system, its really good, because many KPI enforced. For instance, there are 6 to 8 primary KPI, which will cause us trouble if being charged."

[The CEO of Concession company]

4.2.3 Enrolment

Enrolment is the third moment in sociology of translation. It is a process of defining the interrelated roles and align the interest of each actor. In this research, the enrolment process involved via the process of preparation of operating manual, the technology used and the meetings.

Operation manual is the document required by the concession agreement to be prepared by the concession company in every two years. The operation manual is used by all parties involved in the solid waste management operation, including concession company and sub-contractor appointed. Operation manual serve as main reference for operation management staffs in providing waste collection services and public cleansing management services.

The purpose of using operation manual is to avoid non-compliance of KPI.

"We mention clearly in the concession agreement that concession company must develop operation manual. Operation manual must provide detail description on each process. What device to be used in cleaning up waste? How to throw waste from bins to lorry? How to use the lifter? After clean up the waste in bins, where to put it back? Must make sure the bins lid is put back properly. That kind of details must be mentioned in the operation manual."

[Director, Department A]

In term of the communication between actors involve in the solid waste management process, technology has been chosen. There are two level of relationship exist in the process, known as internal relationship and external relationship. Internal relationship refers to the relationship between concession company, branches and subcontractors, while external relationship refers to the relationship between Department A, Corporation X and concession company. Each level of relationship relies heavily on technology. For internal relationship, they use an application called as MResponse and AVLS system

'We use MResponse. Once you clock in at office, you have to log in into the system [Mresponse]. For instance, today my area is Taman Dahlia. Once I reached Taman Dahlia, I log in into the system [MResponse] then I started taking picture on work done before and after, uploaded into the server, and when I go back to office, I will directly transfer the data into 'Laporan Siap Kerja'. And for the lorries, we use AVLS. We know where the lorries go. Idling time also we can monitor. Every single lorry has GPS. Where they start, where they go, all can be monitored. Then, when they idle for more than 15 minutes, SMS will be sent to the centre, and directly sent to service unit manager. Service unit manager has to justify why longer idle time."

[General Manager of concession company]

"And on our site, we have our own control system. We use AVLS system. We have war room at Level 1, the one that you see with lots of screen. So, we will monitor the destination of the lorry. If you see the screen, all bins denoted by red color. Once collected, the color will turn into green. Let say, there is missed collection, green, green, red, green, green. So, we will asked directly why red there. Is they[the collection workers] missed any bins there? That is how we monitor their work."

[CEO of concession company]

For external relationship, the technologies used are handheld and i-MEMS. Handheld is the device use by the enforcement officer to do their work on site. Each of the enforcement officer will be given one handheld. For the communication and monitoring between Corporation X and concession company, they use the system called i-MEMS.

When the enforcement officer goes to site, they will bring the handheld. When the saw any KPIs, they took pictures using the handheld. Then, when they come back to office, they will sync the handheld on trader. Once sync, all the data stored in the handheld will be directly transfer to the i-MEMS system. Branch manager will then verify the KPI in the i-MEMS, and the system will directly send the data to the concession company. All the KPIs can be viewed by the concession company using i-MEMS before 5pm every day. Concession company must give feedback before 12pm on the next day. That is how the system being used in the process.

The final medium used for enrolment is meeting. There are two committees established under the Act 672. The first one is Regional Implementation Committee (RIC). The members of RIC are the Corporation's State Director, concession company and all local governments. The RIC meeting is chaired by the State Director. The frequency of this meeting is once a month. Normally the issues discussed in RIC is more on operational issues, such as to increase the frequency of waste collection, the submission on new area to concession company, complaints from local government on the services provided by the concession company and of course the discussion on KPIs charged to the concession company.

The second committee is Service Level Committee (SLC). SLC is the higher-level committee chaired by The Head of Director Department A. Other members for SLC are the Corporation's CEO, the Corporation's state directors, concession company, secretary of the state government (SUK), Ministry of Finance, Public Private Partnership Unit (UKAS), and Local Government Department (JKT). The issue discussed in this committee is more on policy and the decision that has financial impact to the government. In SLC, all the KPIs for each concession company will be tabled as an indicator on their performance. SLC must set up their meeting at a frequency of three times in a year.

Other than that, there are another monthly meeting held. Concession company performance meeting, to discuss the performance of concession company. Then, there is also meeting on complaints committee. The purpose of this meeting is to make sure that all complaints has been taken corrective action.

4.2.4 Mobilisation

The final moment of translation involves a process of mobilizing passive actor into the network. In this study, the mobilization process done by the focal actor, Department A. Department A together with Corporation X actively give free awareness talk at kindergarten, mosque, and housing area. They also put recycle cage at certain location to help public community manage the recycle items there. This is the first round programme, in order to create awareness and develop interest among community on solid waste management.

The concession company also involved in mobilization process. Currently there is one project conducted by concession company, named as MyKasih. In this project, each community will be given one card, MyKasih card. Every time they sent their recyle items, they will get point. And that point can be redeemed at selected supermarkets for purchase of household items. So far, only Giant Hypermarket and Cmart supermarket at Kulim, Kedah accept the redemption of MyKasih point. Other than that, they are actively done awareness campaign for community. They have the dedicated team call as 'Kembara SAS'. They actively distribute flyers at night market, Ramadhan market, uptown, downtown and other places of public spotlight.

"We spend almost a million a year for awareness program"

[CEO of concession company]

5. CONCLUSION

The aim of the translation process in a network is to reconcile diverse interests of heterogeneous actors. In privatisation of the SWM network, translation has been successful because the focal actor can define and attribute interrelated roles to each actor to be accepted by them (Callon, 1986). This is an important point in ANT, i.e., a successful actor-network that passes through the obligatory passage point, becomes irreversibility entwined and the translated actors are mobilised to address the problematisation (Atkinson, 2002). This finding is consistent with Marques et al. (2011) that public organisations which act as a network coordinator, seem to be shaped by their assessment of motivations to cooperate and of the contribution to network performance of the various organisations involved in the network.

An actor-network has to be stable; thus a coordinated strategy among actors in the network needs to be developed (Callon, 1986, 1990; Latour, 1987, 1996). In the current study, i.e., on the SWM network, the coordinated strategy is developed through the consession agreement and KPI.

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